Against Interpretation

“The fact is, all Western consciousness of and reflection upon art have remained within the confines staked out by the Greek theory of art as mimesis or representation. It is through this theory that art as such—above and beyond given works of art—becomes problematic, in need of defense. And it is the defense of art which gives birth to the odd vision by which something we have learned to call ‘form’ is separated off from something we have learned to call ‘content,’ and to the well-intentioned move which makes content essential and form accessory.”

Sontag builds on her argument by asserting that predominant theories of art in the West are still restricted by the limitations of the early Greek theory of mimesis. She offers a core argumentative point about how such limitations have imposed a new perspective of art involving a supposed difference between “form” and “content.” This is particularly relevant to her critique of content-based interpretation and her support of a new theorization of art, especially one that focuses on aspects of experience and desire, as she elaborates later.

“None of us can ever retrieve that innocence before all theory when art knew no need to justify itself, when one did not ask of a work of art what it said because one knew (or thought one knew) what it did. From now to the end of consciousness, we are stuck with the task of defending art.”

Sontag offers the observation that theory has irrevocably changed our perspective of art, such that there is essentially no way to return to the initial experience of art in its original and pure form. Sontag’s notion that we are incessantly forced to defend art serves to illustrate her view regarding the function of contemporary criticism and her proposed function of ideal criticism, which operates in a different interpretive mode and with a different purpose. This language also offers an emotional approach that aligns with the overall passion of the essay and the plea to experience a work of art or writing viscerally instead of in a dispassionate, intellectual form of interpretation.

“Though the actual developments in many arts may seem to be leading us away from the idea that a work of art is primarily its content, the idea still exerts an extraordinary hegemony. I want to suggest that this is because the idea is now perpetuated in the guise of a certain way of encountering works of art thoroughly ingrained among most people who take any of the arts seriously. What the overemphasis on the idea of content entails is the perennial, never-consummated project of interpretation. And conversely, it is the habit of approaching works of art in order to interpret them that sustains the fancy that there really is such a thing as the content of a work of art.”

Sontag echoes her earlier claim about the prevalence of content-based interpretation, but in this instance, she additionally argues that notions of content only exist as a means of developing an interpretation. Viewers only analyze the contents of a work of art or literature to form interpretive opinions on it; they do not approach the content and form as a singular piece to be taken and enjoyed at face value. Sontag tries to indicate that there is no distinct “content”—there is just the work as a whole. She is also stating that contemporary approaches to art’s supposed content has exercised an unprecedented degree of control and influence over the experience of art.

“The old style of interpretation was insistent, but respectful; it erected another meaning on top of the literal one. The modern style of interpretation excavates, and as it excavates, destroys; it digs 'behind' the text, to find a sub-text which is the true one.”

This portion of the essay juxtaposes earlier and more contemporary interpretive styles. Here, Sontag argues that the primary difference between them is one of care and respect, such that the older style of interpretation adds a new meaning while the newer style of interpretation subtracts and replaces its meaning through analysis. This note is instrumental in Sontag’s general argumentation against interpretation because it offers a glimpse of what the modern style of interpretation has done to alter our perspective of art, so this claim lays the foundation for her appeal to move toward an experiential approach to art.

“The world, our world, is depleted, impoverished enough. Away with all duplicates of it, until we again experience more immediately what we have.”

Prior to this portion of this essay, Sontag proclaims that interpretation is a form of intellectual vengeance against art and against the world itself insofar as it substitutes a new kind of art and a new kind of world in place of the true, existing ones. It implies that art and the world at large are not valuable enough without personal interpretation. She commands a rejection of such a perspective so that a more ideal and proper experience of art may exist again. It is another example of language that is more passionate than academic, emphasizing a more urgent need for her proposed approach to art.

“By reducing the work of art to its content and then interpreting that, one tames the work of art. Interpretation makes art manageable, comfortable.”

Here, the author criticizes content-based interpretation once more by demonstrating how the process effectively diminishes the quality of our experience of art by means of its theorization. By stating that interpretation essentially “tames the work of art,” Sontag implies that art is innately wild before being interpreted, contributing an implicit comment on how our experience of art would be different if we were to avoid interpreting it. Remarking upon it as “comfortable” also alludes to her broader argument that viewers often interpret art to suit their own preexisting beliefs, thus avoiding any opportunity for emotional or intellectual growth.

“This philistinism of interpretation is more rife in literature than in any other art. For decades now, literary critics have understood it to be their task to translate the elements of the poem or play or novel or story into something else.”

Sontag notes that literature is the primary field in which an interpretive critical approach exists. In this passage, she also equates interpretation with “translation,” since it involves the conversion of art into a different phenomenon through a meaning-based approach to content. By describing it this way, she makes clear that an interpretation is not the natural state or purpose of the work; it is inherently something new and distinct.

“Interpretation, based on the highly dubious theory that a work of art is composed of items of content, violates art. It makes art into an article for us, for arrangement into a mental scheme of categories.”

Sontag morally accuses interpretation itself of dealing damage to art, since it objectifies it and leads us to devise a system of classification that causes the depreciation of our experience of art in turn. This notion of categorizing art is another key component of Sontag’s argument because it underlines human society’s natural tendency to sort art, particularly with regard to its supposed content.

“The flight from interpretation seems particularly a feature of modern painting. Abstract painting is the attempt to have, in the ordinary sense, no content; since there is no content, there can be no interpretation.”

When Sontag refers to “[t]he flight from interpretation,” she means an avoidance of the process, which may be achieved by art’s ability to become abstract, among other possibilities. Because abstract painting involves the intentional evasion of content-based interpretation, it serves as an example of the general approach that Sontag favors in her essay. She soon thereafter contrasts abstract painting with pop art, observing that the latter’s content is impossible to interpret by virtue of being demonstrably obvious.

“Perhaps the way one tells how alive a particular art form is is by the latitude it gives for making mistakes in it and still being good.”

During this sections of the essay, Sontag comments on the lively nature of cinema as a new and important form of art, still free from severe interpretation due to its primary existence as mass media at the time. Because of this, it was allowed to be surface level, possessing flaws but still enjoyable. The flaws were not explained away by attempts at finding subtext or underlying interpretations. This momentarily turns from Sontag’s central argument, but it nonetheless offers a significant supplement to the elucidation of her views, as she feels this direct and open approach to cinema is an admirable paradigm that should be applied more often to art and literature.

“What is needed, first, is more attention to form in art. If excessive stress on content provokes the arrogance of interpretation, more extended and more thorough descriptions of form would silence. What is needed is a vocabulary—a descriptive, rather than prescriptive, vocabulary—for forms. The best criticism, and it is uncommon, is of this sort that dissolves considerations of content into those of form.”

Here, Sontag denotes the first necessary step consumers and critics of art must undertake to relieve themselves of content-based interpretation: an increase in time and care expended with respect to form. She also stresses the importance of description over prescriptivist claims, meaning that commentary on art should engage with what is there instead of applying new meaning or elements to it. Form-based criticism is superior to its content-based counterpart because it disposes of the need to interpret.

“Transparence is the highest, most liberating value in art—and in criticism—today. Transparence means experiencing the luminousness of the thing in itself, of things being what they are.”

Toward the end of the essay, Sontag builds on her previous critical remarks by arguing for the power of “transparence,” which she defines as pure experience devoid of interpretation. Her use of superlative praise for this value in art highlights that this is a central goal to achieve when experiencing a work of art, as opposed to a content-based interpretive approach, which she frequently speaks of as a violation of art or a refusal to accept things as they are.

“The aim of all commentary on art now should be to make works of art—and, by analogy, our own experience—more, rather than less, real to us. The function of criticism should be to show how it is what it is, even that it is what it is, rather than to show what it means.”

As Sontag’s essay approaches its close, she offers this remark on how artistic criticism should be directed toward the aspect of reality in art, such that it intends to enhance our vision of art’s true nature. In doing so, artistic criticism must operate under the guidance of reasoning and perception, as opposed to interpretive decision-making that would reduce art to the meaning of its supposed content. Here, Sontag proposes a function of ideal criticism, particularly one which stands in stark contrast from the criticism of her time.